Cloud Gateway & MCP
The Cloud Gateway is Regent Control delivered as a hosted service: your agent gets a URL and a key — no container to deploy. Every tool call the agent makes (a Stripe charge, a Slack message, an email) is authorized by the gate, and the real provider credential is injected from Regent’s vault — so the agent never holds it and physically can’t bypass the checks.
You configure it by chatting over MCP (or in the dashboard), and your agents act over a second MCP endpoint.
One brain, two MCPs
There are two MCP servers. Don’t mix them up: one is where a human configures, the other is where an agent acts.
| Admin MCP (management) | Tools MCP (runtime) | |
|---|---|---|
| URL | https://api.regentprotocol.org/v1/mcp | https://gw.regentprotocol.org/gw/mcp |
| Purpose | create agents, mandates, keys, tools | the agent calls tools + pays |
| Auth | Authorization: Bearer <API key> | Bearer <control key> + X-Agent-Id header |
| When | once, at onboarding | at runtime, every call |
| Docs | Admin MCP → | Tools MCP → |
The three-sided rule
Every tool follows the same split — and it’s deliberate:
| Part | Who does it | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Configure the tool (routing: base URL, encoding, spend limit) | you / your assistant | Admin MCP or dashboard |
| Vault the provider secret (the Stripe/Slack/AgentMail key) | a human only | dashboard /connect/gateway |
| Call the tool | the agent | Tools MCP /gw/mcp |
The provider secret is the only step a human must do. Why can’t the agent vault its own key? Because then the agent would have seen it — and the whole guarantee is that it never does. A secret must never pass through an agent’s context.
The flow
Agent (Claude, LangChain, any)
│ MCP / HTTP + control key + X-Agent-Id
▼
gw.regentprotocol.org (Cloud Gateway, multi-tenant)
│ 1. key → org → your tool catalog
│ 2. intent → gate: identity ∥ mandate ∥ Guardian risk → Cedar policy
│ 3. ALLOW → inject the vaulted credential → call the provider
│ DENY → blocked, provider never touched
│ ESCALATE → parked for a human
▼
Stripe · Slack · AgentMail · custody wallet · any HTTP API